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Poetics 
Josh Robinson 
 
 
This chapter discusses three works published in the field of poetics (broadly conceived) 
during 2015, exploring their commonalities, mutual implications, compatibilities and 
tensions. It begins with a discussion of Marjorie Perloff’s Poetics in a New Key: 
Interviews and Essays, focusing in particular on the author’s programmatic (and 
frequently polemical) declaration of her principles in the book’s preface. It discusses the 
implications of her evaluative and prescriptive approach, and brings to light some of the 
tensions that it involves, with particular relation to her instructions concerning theory 
and its relationship to the study of poetry. It then turns to Reginald Gibbons’s account 
of How Poems Think, analysing the implications both of his conceptual optic of 
‘working against the grain’—a way of thinking developed in dialogue with Donald 
Davie and Hélène Cixous—and of the way in which it both illuminates and is 
illuminated by the engagement with poems. Focusing on Gibbons’s analyses of rhyme, 
it examines the resources offered by his comparative approach, drawing on readings of 
French, German, Greek and Russian poetry as well as that written in English, and 
considers the ways in which poetics learns from and comes to resemble poetry in its 
ambitious attempt to formulate a prose account of the thinking of verse technique. It 
ends by discussing Rebecca Sanchez’s Deafening Modernism: Embodied Language and 
Visual Poetics in American Literature, and in doing so considers both the resonances of 
Gibbons’s account of the resources of language for poetries of non-spoken languages, 
and Sanchez’s account of the implications and potential resources of the analysis of 
American Sign Language poetry for literary studies more generally. 
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In her preface to Poetics in a New Key: Interviews and Essays, Marjorie Perloff sets out 
a programmatic statement of her poetics that both reflects on her writings—those 
collected in the book, and her broader œuvre—and sets out what she considers its most 
urgent implications. This volume—edited by David Jonathan Y. Bayot, first published 
by De La Salle University Publishing House in 2013, and now republished by the 
University of Chicago Press to extend its distribution ‘in the Americas and in Europe’ 
(p. xviii)—collects fourteen twenty-first-century dialogues and interviews between 
Perloff and a range of scholars and poets from the United States and Europe on the 
concerns and current state of poetry, alongside three essays—on her own academic 
biography, on bilingualism and pedagogy of poetry in translation, and (the only piece 
collected in the book originally to have been published before 2000) on the intellectual 
in the twenty-first century, her programmatic account of the contemporary tasks and 
challenges faced by poets and critics as set out in a contribution to a roundtable on 
‘Intellectuals’ in the September 1997 issue of PMLA. 
Perloff closes the preface with what she terms five ‘further Don’ts’ extrapolated 
from and written to mark the centenary of Pound’s ‘A Few Don’ts’, and presents them 
as ‘squarely in the Pound tradition but also, I hope, apropos in 2013’. The fifth and last 
of these is a programmatic injunction pertaining to the ways in which poetry and theory 
are brought together: 
 
 
Don’t forget that, whether consciously or unconsciously, all poems are written 
with an eye (and ear) to earlier poetry and that to write poetry at all, one must first 
read a lot of it. And of course one reads poetry and writes about it in the light of 
theory—but it should, to my mind, be literary theory. So I would say put down 
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thy Agamben and pick up Eric Auerbach’s Mimesis, and, turning to poetry itself, 
pick up thy Auden, thy Ashbery, thy Rae Armantrout. Put down thy Badiou and 
read Beckett, Bernhard, Bachmann, Christian Bök. Put down the latest Žižek (at 
this writing, Less than Nothing: Hegel and the Shadow of Dialectical 
Materialism, 2012) and read Chaucer through the lens of Caroline Bergvall’s 
Muddle English, Charles Peirce through the lens of Susan Howe’s Pierce Arrow 
and That This, and Goethe’s ‘Erlkönig’ side by side with Charles Bernstein’s ‘Elf 
King.’ (p. xvii) 
 
The somewhat overblown character of this both contentious and polemical 
instruction finds its echo in the jocular and self-mocking repetition of archaic second-
person singular possessive determiners of the third and fourth sentences. Indeed, this 
represents an abrupt switch from the use of ‘you’ in Perloff’s first four don’ts, a you 
which is much closer to the I in which she makes her injunctions, as is clear in the 
entreaty ‘let us reread Swift and Pope’ (p. xvi), in the question as to whether ‘you and I’ 
are ‘really not complicit’ in the capitalist system (pp. xvi–xvii), and in the reminder of 
what ‘we read’ in Stein (p. xvii). The shift to the wry parody of a biblical 
commandment apes the voice of a deity that at once addresses a multitude as a unified 
singular addressee and singles out every individual within it, as if to insure against the 
possibility of being taken too literally (for who would make the mistake of taking 
Marjorie Perloff to be god, even a god whose commands are only expressed within 
indirect speech, prefaced as they are by the further deflating ‘I would say’?). That is to 
say, what presents itself in the language of the divine, personal address to each 
individual reader at the same time, by virtue of this somewhat over-inflated archaism, 
purports to be an address to nobody at all. 
It is nonetheless worth dwelling for a moment on Perloff’s command, however 
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much it subverts its own force by couching itself in a pastiche of biblical cadence. For 
there are two distinct elements to it, which nonetheless relate closely to one another. 
The first, the more apparent and the most obviously contentious, is the instruction to 
stop reading theory—or at least to stop reading a certain kind of theory, or to stop 
reading it in a certain way. For the proper names Žižek, Agamben and Badiou serve as 
figures not I think for theory tout court, but rather for the waves within which certain 
kinds of intellectual trend seem to establish themselves only to recede as they give way 
to the next flavour of the month. Perloff’s objection seems to be—or, perhaps, a less 
polemical and abbreviated version of it might be—that the work of these and analogous 
figures is being read and brought into conjunction with poetry without adequate 
reflection as to its appropriateness—and, perhaps, without adequate examination of the 
critical-theoretical traditions from which it emerges, and with which it is in dialogue. As 
such it would be a plea for more careful and attentive reading of poetry (and, indeed, not 
incompatible with a plea for more careful and attentive reading of theory)—and in 
particular, for closer and more careful attention to the relationship between theory and 
poetry, and to the ways in which they are brought together. 
Even this relatively generous interpretation, however, raises multiple questions, 
the most pressing (if at the same time also perhaps the cheapest) of which is that of its 
implications for her own writing. For if poetry is most appropriately read (or even, 
depending on the temporal scope of the injunction to ‘put down’, only to be read) 
alongside poetic responses to it, what is the place for writing such as Perloff’s? Why 
read Perloff when one can instead read Caroline Bergvall, Susan Howe and Charles 
Bernstein? Moreover, it is striking that the one example of acceptably literary theory is 
Auerbach’s mimesis, almost as if to suggest that the sixty years since the publication of 
its translation into English (and seventy since the first German edition) have not resulted 
in the writing of literary-theoretical work worthy of the attention of scholars of poetry. 
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What, one wonders, are in Perloff’s view the more recent and contemporary equivalents 
of Auerbach? And if there are none, what conditions would aspiring contenders to this 
legacy have to fulfil? How does Perloff’s own work relate both to this legacy and to the 
poets whose work she champions? Indeed, is she willing to recommend her own work 
to readers as strongly as she recommends the work of the contemporary poets she finds 
most interesting? 
Of course, she acknowledges that the choice she presents between poetry and 
theory is something of a false dichotomy, and that all engagement with poetry takes 
place ‘in the light of theory’. But the nature of this engagement as it is set out within 
this fifth don’t is somewhat diffuse. For the second of the two elements I identify within 
Perloff’s command is a certain conflation between the reading and the writing of poetry, 
as evidenced by the slippage from the initial proclamation that ‘to write poetry at all, 
one must first read a lot of it’ to the concession that ‘of course one reads poetry and 
writes about it in the light of theory’ and its associated exhortation as to which theory to 
read (and which not to read). So what seems to begin as an instruction about writing 
poetry becomes a set of instructions about reading poetry, and then in turn about writing 
about poetry. As a result, the prescriptive nature of Perloff’s don’ts (which they share 
with their Poundian forebears) seems to be caught between the demands of advice to 
poets and advice to students and scholars of poetry. 
Indeed, this tension between the demands of writing poetry and those of reading 
and writing about it is encapsulated within her description of Pound’s ‘A Few Don’ts’ 
as ‘still the best road map we have for the understanding of how poetry works’ (p. xvii): 
that is to say, the prescriptive instructions given to a poet as to how to write better 
poetry also serve as resources that aid the scholar in the study of poetry. And the first of 
Perloff’s don’ts are explicitly toward this end, its opening sentence —‘Don’t assume 
that “free” verse, now the default mode of poetry [sic] is equivalent to the mere practice 
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of lineation’ (p. xvi)—not so much extrapolated as paraphrased from the phrase she 
cites two sentences later: ‘“Don’t imagine that a thing will ‘go’ in verse just because it’s 
too dull to go in prose” (Pound)’. Similarly, still in Perloff’s first don’t, the reader is 
instructed to ‘remember that “A rhyme must have in it some slight element of surprise if 
it is to give pleasure” (Pound)’, as Pound’s indicative statement of necessity is 
transposed into the imperative, again directed toward writers who use rhyme rather than 
critics and theorists of it—although the instruction to remember does perhaps also admit 
the possibility that rhyme might interestingly or productively be used for purposes other 
than to give pleasure. 
Perloff’s bringing together of the prescriptive advice to the poet with resources for 
the understanding of poetry is of course by no means necessarily an inappropriate 
conflation, since a set of instructions as to how to write a good (or better) poem is at the 
very least founded on a theoretical account, however implicit, of how poetry works. 
Indeed, her preface explicitly defends the making of such judgements—against a 
background in which she claims that ‘[i]n most academic circles today, as I know only 
too well, the very reference to value is taboo’ (p. xii)—while also contending that such 
judgements are more widespread than their makers might admit: 
 
Yet, as I have often noted, we all make value judgments, if not of the poetic texts 
themselves, then in our choices of the theorists we cite or cultural paradigms we 
apply to the work. ‘As Agamben says…,’ ‘as Badiou notes’: these stock phrases 
immediately impose particular values. Again, the very choice of subject is always 
already a value judgment. (p. xii) 
 
Here the slippage between (plural) values, in the sense of a set of principles or 
standards that inform an account of a poem, and value judgements, in the sense of the 
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attribution of absolute or relative merit according to a particular set of principles or 
standards, is not crucial to the argument, which is that the choice to pay attention (of 
whatever kind) to one thing rather than to another is itself a judgement (however 
implicit and unacknowledged) as to its value, to its worthiness of our attention—this 
applies as much to choices of poets and poems as to theorists and theoretical paradigms. 
What becomes clear is the kind of engagement with theory to which Perloff is objecting, 
and against which she us counselling. For these ‘as …’ sentences represent not merely a 
reading of poetry with and in the light of theory, but rather a reading of poetry 
according to a theoretical paradigm that is established as authoritative, whether in 
advance or during the course of analysis. 
That is to say, the endorsement of or appeal to the work of a particular theorist 
who is set up as an authority represents an abrogation of the critical judgement that is 
for Perloff (and not only for Perloff) so central both to the experience and to the account 
of the poem—although whether this judgement is strictly speaking a judgement of value 
is by no means a simple, let alone an already resolved question. The appeal to the 
theorist as authority is thus an abrogation of critical reading—and where Perloff’s 
polemic weakens her argument is in her mistaking of this appeal to a theoretical 
authority for all possible ways of reading and writing about poetry alongside any theory 
that is not (or not only or not obviously) literary. For the appeal to a theoretical 
authority forecloses the possibility of critical engagement not only with the poem 
(which in the version she rejects is presented as merely exemplary of the pre-existing 
theoretical framework), but also with the theory under discussion. Perloff thus rejects a 
model in which poetry serves only to exemplify the cognitions and contentions of 
eminent and fashionable theorists, but in doing so she throws out the theoretical baby 
along with the uncritically theoretical bathwater: her rejection of the reading of poetry 
alongside theory that is not obviously literary also forecloses the possibility that in the 
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confrontation between theory and poetry, both might learn from one another. 
This foreclosure sets up something of an over-simplified schema, in which the 
only choices are to appeal to a theoretical authority and to trust in one’s own judgement: 
 
For better or worse, in any case, I have increasingly come to drop the ‘as …’ 
clause and rely on my own judgment, informed, as I hope that judgment is, by 
years of reading and studying poetry. Then, too, I have come to realize that each 
of us has his or her own preconceptions and predilections—preconceptions often 
highly personal, and culturally as well as biographically grounded. (p. xii) 
 
Perloff chooses (and backs) her own critical judgement in preference to 
abrogation of judgement in favour of reliance on an authority figure, but she seems to 
do so at the cost of accounting for this judgement and her trust in it, instead proceeding 
as if her preferences, because they are bound up with her own history, can be 
acknowledged but need no discussion: ‘I myself; for example, have never shared my 
colleagues’ admiration for Charles Olson; for me he fails on two counts: his language 
does not have the density I look for in poetry, and his rhetoric is insistently and overtly 
masculinist in ways I find irritating.’ (pp. xii–xiii) On the one hand she has subjected 
her preferences to a sufficiently rigorous examination as to have uncovered the 
underlying principles that inform and unite them—that she considers density desirable 
in poetry, and masculinist rhetoric less so. On the other hand, these preferences are 
presented as grounded in nothing more than the fact of their existence: any particular 
preference might be historically and socially contingent, but even if so, it just is. 
This is of course one way of dealing with aesthetic and poetic dissensus, and 
Perloff’s ‘take it or leave it’ approach has a certain attraction to it. At the same time, 
there is something a little dissatisfying about it, a dissatisfaction that results less from 
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the fact that the question as to why these particular preferences rather than those of 
anyone else remains unasked, and more from the fact that the implications of the 
plurality of critical judgements (and of her response to this plurality) remain 
unexamined. This is one of the areas in which Perloff’s aversion to doing theory the 
wrong way means that its consequences are not formulated to as full an extent as might 
be possible. Indeed, it is as if this aversion is precisely the same kind of personal 
preference as her preference for poetic density and her dislike of masculinist rhetoric—
with the result that the aversion to theory is itself no more than a preference with its 
own foundation in her personal, biographical and cultural experiences. 
This in turn has implications for the status of Perloff’s don’ts—for if they are 
simply one set of possible prescriptions among many, then the question arises as to who 
should follow them, and why. This is I think reflected in the way in which the focus of 
their concern shifts between the writing of poetry and that of criticism. The 
prescriptions concerning theory of the fifth of her don’ts do not obviously pertain either 
to the writing or to the theorizing of poetry, but rather to reading poetry, and more 
particularly to the ways in which this reading is made visible in writing, whether that of 
students for assessment or of critics for publication. Here theory refers to something that 
is done by other people, something that is in a sense prior to poetry, and that is 
sometimes used by people who write about poetry. Perloff’s commandments are not 
addressed to the writers of this theory—either because their theory is already adequately 
literary, such that they have no need of it (if, indeed, any such adequately literary 
theorists remain alive), or because they are by definition insufficiently interested in 
poetry to be of proper use to Perloff’s addressees—but rather to people who might be 
tempted to make use of it. 
That is to say, the writing to which Perloff exhorts her readers does not fit 
obviously into the categories she uses—or to put it the other way around, she does not 
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offer an explicit account of that writing which she demands of her readers, or indeed of 
her own writing. The injunction not to use theory (or, not to use insufficiently literary 
theory) in order to account for and analyse poetry, but rather to use poetry (poetry that is 
aware of and explicitly responds to its history) for this purpose is less a plea not to read 
and think about poetry with theory, and more only to write about poetry with a 
particular kind of theory. But the questions as to what precisely this writing is and why 
it should be so desirable remain largely unanswered—and even unraised. The 
implication of her prescription seems to be that by refraining from the appeal to theory 
(determined in advance) aspiring critics of poetry will be able to refine and develop 
their judgements, perhaps in order better to be able to understand and account for 
poetry. But the unwillingness to offer a defence of these critical judgements except on 
the basis that they are no more arbitrary than those of anybody else calls into question 
the cogency—and indeed the value—of any such resulting account. 
Reginald Gibbons’s account of How Poems Think takes a fundamentally different 
approach, offering an exploration of ‘a few of the many modes and devices of poetic 
thinking’ which is carried out ‘not comprehensively but illustratively’ (p. 1). Its concern 
is with the ways of thinking that are specific to poetry, but because these ways depend 
on the configuration of poems’ relationships toward the world outside their bounds, the 
‘stances that poets take toward everything outside poetry’, this thinking is not divorced 
from but rather intimately entwined with and indeed necessarily dependent ‘on thinking 
outside poetry’ (p. 1). The thinking with which Gibbons’s study is concerned is thus not 
confined to the interior of the poem, but rather comes about at the interface between the 
world of the poem and the world of its readers, in their encounters with it, and in their 
implications and ramifications. ‘Poetic thinking has technical, structural, and psychical 
aspects, and these encompass both the poet’s process of composition and the reader’s 
responsive process of understanding and experiencing the movement of a poem.’ (p. 1) 
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Gibbons shares with Perloff an awareness of the roles played by the history—
sometimes felicitous, sometimes the result of deliberate choices—of his experiences and 
training in the development of his conception and account of poetic thinking. But rather 
than offering a positivist account of his choices and their consequences for his thinking 
out of his biographical history as if to place them beyond consideration, Gibbons offers 
a reflective and sophisticated account of how this history both enables and hinders his 
work, and of how what appears to be a barrier often turns out to be a resource, while 
what seems to be the most natural and given—‘the grain of the poet’s own linguistic 
and artistic being—mind, culture, and textures of writerly traditions’ (p. 8)—so 
frequently ends up getting in the way. Indeed, this is precisely the concern of his first 
chapter, which offers an account of what he terms ‘a personal, individual, aspect of 
writing poems: the poet’s relationship to what seems to be in the way’ (p. 8). 
He offers an account of the intellectual and personal influences on his theorization 
of these processes, focusing in particular on the striking combination (‘the oddest 
couple ever’ (p. 8), he concedes) of figures whose teaching and writing has informed 
and shaped the development of his interest in and conception of poetic thinking—
namely Donald Davie and Hélène Cixous. In their thinking and writing he finds ‘a self-
divided inner process of translation back and forth between opposed impulses’ (p. 7): 
 
They both wrestled with and wrestled free of some portion of what was given in 
the temperament and linguistic formation of each, in a process of becoming. That 
thought leads me to a poetic line that we might read as merely a temporal 
exaggeration of the life-long development of the poet’s technē and thinking, 
which becomes itself only through its changes. (p. 7) 
 
These opposed impulses find their manifestations in pointedly different ways. 
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Gibbons draws attention to how in writing Davie ‘could be acerbic, even caustic, yet 
might also express his partial admiration for that which he attacked’ (p. 27): here the 
wrestling consists in learning from those with whom one disagrees (or perhaps, 
conversely, in robustly criticizing those with whom one agrees, albeit not to the fullest 
extent). Similarly, he is presented as ‘a poet who worked very hard to open up his own 
work to himself, or to try to know capabilities in himself that he didn’t feel were the 
most natural to him but which he wanted to have and to use’ (p. 21): the act of coming 
to know these capabilities involves firstly a recognition that there is something within 
him that is at the same time alien to him—something that is not fully known or 
mastered—and secondly a process of learning how this unfamiliar and potentially 
threatening capacity can be used. 
Meanwhile, the tensions and self-divisions Gibbons identifies within Cixous’s 
work consists less in her relationships to her interlocutors than in the complex ways in 
which she ‘has brought a bodily specificity into her writing’ (p. 32) by means of ‘the 
plasticity, richness, and startling meaning-making possibilities of the sounds of 
language’ (p. 32). He draws attention to the ways in which her thought and writing have 
‘especially emphasized the value of linguistic play, of yielding to the inventiveness of 
language itself’ (p. 32)—that is to say, the playfulness that is frequently taken to be 
characteristic of deconstructive writing is here presented not as (or not solely as) a 
subjective act of wilful or even assertive invention, but rather as a giving way to to an 
inventiveness that is already present within language, as a responsiveness to the 
properties and the potentials of linguistic material. Indeed, this involves a fundamental 
reconfiguration of the relationship between subject and object: the yielding is neither the 
imposition of an active subject onto a passive object nor the simple inversion of these 
poles according to which the subject becomes subservient. This, rather, is not a 
relationship in which one has priority over other, but in which the rewards are to the 
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benefit of both, ‘in order to give not only language but also one’s own psyche more 
freedom of discovery and articulation’ (p. 32). 
This freedom of discovery is free not in the sense of unrestricted in its choice of 
action, but rather of the possibility of enabling or realizing a potential that could not 
otherwise be realized. And this potential realization is not that of an externalizable and 
fungible human achievement that is celebrated for its own sake or for the sake of the 
difficulty or intricacy of the effort involved, but rather precisely because it of its lasting 
effects on the relationship between humans and language. So when Gibbons argues that 
Cixous ‘wants to create a palpability of language and of what language names and 
describes, a materialization of the physical world’ (pp. 32–33), he is referring not 
simply to this palpability for its own sake, but to its potential to transform both language 
and our relationship to it, what we can do with it—and what it can do with us. And this 
transformation by means of conceptual and phonetic play disrupts ‘the smoothness, the 
spherical idealization’ that ‘Cixous regards as an imprisoning of thought’ (p. 33). 
Gibbons distinguishes the constraints and restrictions with which Cixous works 
from those of Davie’s writing (and indeed of his own) in that they are to a much greater 
extent external to and imposed upon her: 
 
But Cixous does not have to go against her own grain in order to champion and 
exemplify writing that opens a way for the language to play. She lifts into view an 
aspect of writing, or an experience of writing, and offers it in opposition to writing 
that is constrained by the typical use of rationality, by the limits imposed on 
women in patriarchic societies, and by the individual aversion to reading as an 
encounter with profound potential reversals of received ideas and received modes 
of articulation. For her, the writer begins from awareness of having committed a 
crime—like Augustine’s childhood theft of pears—and writing is the exuberant, 
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even if agonized (as in Kafka), fulfillment rather than redemption of that crime. 
(p. 33) 
 
For Cixous, unlike for Davie, the process of going against the grain involves not 
so much coming to terms with potentially unpleasant or threatening capacities within 
her as much as the development of a kind of writing that distinguishes itself from, 
rejects and ultimately comes to oppose the writing that exemplifies ‘the typical use of 
rationality’. Whereas Davie’s working against the grain starts with the recognition of an 
uncomfortable, unknown, perhaps even potentially dangerous capacity within him, a 
capacity which is then to be mastered or tamed in order that it can be used without 
transgression, Cixous’s begins from the recognition, after the fact, that a transgression 
has taken place, and seeks not to rectify it but to complete it. Writing is thus an act of 
rebellion, a challenge to the patriarchal order—which is at the same time a condition of 
the possibility of this very resistance to it. 
Gibbons admits that the way in which the account of working against the grain 
that he develops from his own sustained encounters—one as a student, one much later 
in life—with these two very different figures brings together a perhaps somewhat 
uncomfortably wide range of different phenomena and responses, acknowledging the 
very different ways ‘in which Davie and Cixous have helped me to try to open up poetic 
thinking for myself’ (p. 40). And the grain against and within which he himself works is 
different once again: 
 
At any rate, I am in the grain of the English language, with its copious lexicon of 
words for the material, palpable, visible, audible, tasteable, world. And I am 
aware now that the knots in the wood that divert that grain, obstructing it and 
swirling it off this way and that, are themselves part of the grain. (p. 40) 
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What appears as a break in the grain in the form of a knot is revealed as not other 
to the grain but part of it, an interruption or diversion that the grain performs on itself. 
And similarly, the resources of the language with which Gibbons is most familiar, 
within which he resides, with which he works, along with many of the other poets 
whose work he discusses, frequently contain interruptions or breaks—breaks that 
themselves are often if not always part of the very fabric of that language rather than 
imposed upon it by something from the outside. This is what he theorizes as ‘the 
necessary and productive self-alienation of the poet, who must work in words so 
closely, and with such openness to language, that only by coming to see the words on 
the page, and to hear them in the ear, as belonging as much to themselves and to the 
language as to the poet who composes them, can the poet discover how to think with 
them and through them, beyond the artistic limits of the ingrained individual habits of 
language and poetic thinking, and beyond the limits imposed by the poet’s self-
positioning within culture’ (p. 9). 
Gibbons’s investigation of this self-alienation proceeds on the basis that ‘[a]s we 
read a text, we may be read by it’ (p. 45); the work (he seems to use the terms text and 
work interchangeably) as it enables us to notice and respond to what we had not 
previously noticed. And at the same time, in a process that ‘is not merely self-reflexive’ 
but that ‘also brings to our awareness our unconscious understanding of words and the 
world, and this allows us to enlarge that understanding’ (p. 46), the writing of a poem or 
a novel can emerge from such an experience, and at the same time have the effect of 
bringing about new ways of thinking within its readers. This reciprocity is what is at 
stake in the exploration of the idea that not only the reader’s but also ‘the writer’s 
experience of language is sometimes that of another’ (p. 42)—more specifically, it is 
frequently the experience of externalization or alienation, of transforming something 
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internal into the something that can be experienced as other not only by readers, but also 
by ourselves. ‘The act of writing, and the result of it, is to place something that was 
“inside” oneself outside oneself, where we are free to regard it as “alien” and then 
inquire of it what it is saying back to us—through our word choice, its evocation of our 
memories and states of feeling, its energy or inertness, its bluntness or subtleties, as 
language.’ (pp. 49–50). And this is the alienation not simply of something that one has 
made, but of an intimate part of the self, the implications of which are that ‘[t]he art of 
writing and the art of reading, as I see them, are in part a dividing or perhaps a 
circulating of the psyche’ (p. 36). 
Gibbons’s account of this process of externalization—which is at the same time a 
defence both of compositional practices that use it and of the readerly appreciation of its 
results—‘runs against the dominant mode (in many different forms) of modern and 
contemporary American poetry’ (p. 9). As a counterpoint both to these dominant modes 
and to the constraints and resources of his being in the grain of the English language, 
Gibbons offers a comparative account informed not only by the different ways in which 
poetry thinks in languages other than English—including French, German, Greek and 
Russian—and in which modes of thinking from the verse of the ancient world have 
persisted, but also by reflection on the process of translating and commenting on a poem 
in one language into and in another. In his account of rhyme, for example, discussion of 
George Herbert and John Keats sits alongside that of Ilya Kutik and Paul Celan to 
illuminate some of the different resources presented by rhyme for the development and 
analysis of the thinking of poetry, resources which appear very differently in the 
examination of poetry in multiple languages together from the conclusions that might be 
drawn from consideration of English-language poems alone. 
Gibbons addresses the question of how rhyme might think, of the kinds of 
thinking it might be able to carry out. Fundamental to this conception of rhyme as 
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thinking is the sense that rhyme creates relationships between the rhymed words that are 
not those of the poem’s syntax: 
When we read or hear a poem, a potent rhyme-pair sets us thinking and feeling on 
a short path that creates a conceptual and even an implied syntactic relationship between 
the two words, apart from the phrases and sentences of the poem. The thought created 
by the rhyme accompanies and supplements for just a moment what the poem 
articulates. That is, the rhyme may give us supplementary meanings and even phantom 
statements that the poem does not present explicitly. (pp. 62–3) 
He remarks on the ‘infrequent showing in English-language poetry’ of this kind of 
rhyme relative to his contention that ‘most of the rhyming in any anthology of canonical 
poetry in English is ornamental’ (p. 63), observing that Herbert ‘could exceed the 
merely ornamental’ by means of ‘an intricate weaving of repeated sounds all through 
the lines, so that the end-rhymes do not need to think very much’ (p. 63). Here there 
seems to be an interesting and implicit tension at work between thought and mere 
ornament, decoration or pleasure. Discussing the density of internal rhymes and vowel 
echoes in Herbert’s ‘Virtue’, Gibbons contends that ‘[a]t the very least, all this gives us 
pleasures of the ear’ (p. 63): thinking is at once more than, in excess of pleasure, and 
hard work, which the end-rhymes are only able to escape because so much of it has 
been carried out by the ‘intricate weaving’ of complex sound patterns throughout the 
rest of the poem’s lines. 
This configuration of the relationship between thought and pleasure suggests an 
implicit underlying conception of both—and thinking in particular—as additive or 
supplementary. Herbert, we are told, ‘does add ideas’—the periphrastic verb form 
perhaps betraying an unease with the formulation—‘by means of the acoustic 
equivalency of “bright” and “tonight” (this phantom statement is of a sharp 
contradiction) and the acoustic equivalency of “sky” and “die” (that is, in the 
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paradoxical idea of the death of something that does not, cannot, die)’ (p. 63). While 
this account persuasively locates the thinking that is specific to poetry within the 
manifestations of poetic and compositional technique, it seems to me to run the danger 
of undermining Gibbons’s conception of how poems think by presenting thought as 
something superimposed on top of the poem that would otherwise be merely 
pleasurable, its rhymes merely decorative. While the distinction between ornamental 
rhyme and rhyme that thinks seems conceptually important, the account of it is thus not 
as compelling as it might be—and could I think be made more so by closer examination 
of both the pleasure and the thought of rhyme (and the complex relationships between 
the two) through the lens of Gibbons’s concept of working against the grain, 
particularly given the apparent conception of thinking as obstruction (or obstructed), 
particularly in comparison with the relative ease of pleasure. 
This is all the more the case given his comparative approach that is highly astute 
to the different resources and the different resistances offered by different languages. He 
draws attention in ‘Virtue’ to a ‘density of repeated phonemes’ that ‘reminds us that the 
English language is an excellent medium for sound repetition that is short of full rhyme, 
and we hear this marker (in the basic indexical sense) of poetic language in poetry 
without end-rhyme, too’ (p. 64). This contrasts with his discussion of ‘a kind of poetic 
thinking, based partly on rhyme, that few poets writing in English have pursued’ (p. 
69)—a discussion that develops out of a process of ‘working for several years with 
[Ilya] Kutik on translations of his own poems’ (p. 69) and those of several other Russian 
poets, out of which he began ‘to understand why translations of Russian poems do not 
show us what is marvelous about how thought and feeling, eye and ear, move in the 
originals’ (p. 69)—a movement that, in a manner that resounds with the discussion of 
the poetic externalization of language, involves language listening to itself. 
Gibbons’s characterization of the difference is that ‘Russian poetry prizes making 
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the absent, the spiritual, and the inconceivable seem palpable, English poetry mostly 
prizes making what is concrete and palpable and visible, thingy, touchable, seem 
present’ (p. 70), and I find myself at once struck by the admission of ‘mostly’ and 
asking whether this is truly the case—it is not so much that I wish to disagree as that I 
would appreciate an account of how this conclusion was drawn. And something similar 
happens in his discussion of the differences in which the two poetries think: 
 
Hoping I have understood well the translation lessons I have received from Kutik, 
I will say that Russian poetry can think ‘synthetically’ by unifying simultaneous 
discrepant connotations, gathering them together in the mind as one overall idea 
or impression from the simultaneous possibilities of, say, a poetic image. English, 
meanwhile, as we know, tends to think ‘analytically’ by discriminating among the 
connotations of that image, ruling one or two in and all the others out. (p. 69) 
 
On the one hand this seems to be an account that includes a refreshingly honest 
admission of the limits of its author’s expertise. On the other hand, this admission 
seems at the same time to be a way of avoiding the process of thinking with and about 
poetry, in favour of a presentation of its result. That is to say, rather than working 
through the details of an example of this unification to offer an account of the way in 
which a given Russian poem attains synthesis by means of images, we are presented 
with the conclusion but with little way of assessing how compelling it might be, a sense 
exacerbated by the implicit deferral of an element of the responsibility for that 
conclusion by means of the admission of fallibility. Meanwhile, the ‘as we know’ exerts 
a similar effect by means of the assertion of expertise, placing the conclusion beyond 
discussion by appealing to a shared body of knowledge as if it has been established. 
This is perhaps testimony to the difficulty in setting out a fully formulated account of 
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how poems think in prose: indeed, if the thinking of poetry could easily be set out in 
prose then it could hardly claim to be a specific kind of thinking, so it is perhaps the 
case that a certain aporetic character is only to be expected. It would nonetheless I think 
have been more persuasive if these moments had contained at the very least an 
acknowledgement of the difficulty involved, perhaps even an account of it.  
A much more persuasive and satisfying account of the ways in which poetry 
thinks, and a more clearly articulated point of comparison between English and Russian 
(and German) is set out within the discussion of what Gibbons, following Kutik, terms 
‘centrifugal’ rhyme—‘when one word attracts the unexpected rhyme word for itself, this 
second word of the rhyme-pair throws the poem outward from itself as it exists so far, 
throws it off what had seemed its course’ (p. 78). He sets out the distinction between 
Russian- and English-language rhyme practice: 
 
In English, the first word of a possible rhyme-pair is tested by the poet for the 
balance between the necessity it enforces that the second word have a certain 
sound and the opportunity it offers that the second word be different in other 
ways. Kutik’s Russian version of this is that the first word invites another word 
with a similar sound, or attracts it by a kind of phonetic magnetism, or the first 
word discovers the second word for itself, out of love—almost without needing 
the poet. (p. 75) 
 
The attraction of the second word turns into a moment of surprise, of diversion, of 
self-diversion: ‘With this rhyme, the poem throws itself off a path that is safe, with a 
motion that is justified, created, vouched for, by the rhyme.’ (p. 78) What is key here is 
that the second word of the rhyme pair ‘changes the poem’s direction’ (p. 78) after it 
has itself been launched by the first: that is to say, the first word of the rhyme pair 
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seems to bring about a change in direction that alters the course that it has itself set. The 
discussion of centrifugal rhyme thus subtly alters Gibbons’s conception of poetic 
movement according to which a poem moves ‘by means of a series of images evoked by 
words whose similarity of sound (phonetic repetition alone or also morphological 
repetition, which is a drawing out of one word the next one [sic]) creates an image’ (p. 
73): in centrifugal rhyme the second word is not so much drawn out of the first as 
launched by it, but in such a way that it is not merely a projectile on a course that has 
been set, but rather can itself alter not only its own course, but also that of the poem 
from and within which it was launched. 
But despite this unpredictability, the launching of a rhyme in order that it might 
deviate does not involve a careering out of control. Centrifugal ‘does not mean 
incoherent’; what it sets in motion ‘achieves an authoritative coherence of sound and 
idea, feeling and image, that compels a reader’s exhilarated trust’ (p. 78). Gibbons 
draws the contrast between centrifugal and centripetal movement, which ‘keeps 
everything within the poem, closer to what is expected—emotionally or linguistically, 
by poet and by reader—and to what is knowable or already known, closer to ideas 
already shared by poet and reader, consensual’ (p. 78), but the opposition to the 
containment of the regular and harmonious centripetal movement that remains internal 
to the poem is not a random, uncontrolled or arbitrary movement, but rather a 
movement ‘outward toward that which almost cannot yet be imagined or grasped’ (p. 
78). The primary difference, that is, is in its orientation beyond what has already been 
set in motion before it—toward something that is unpredictable, and yet always 
possible. 
What is equally important here is that the unpredictable trajectory of centrifugal 
rhyme is set in motion by an impulse already present within the resources of language, 
even if that impulse is not obviously visible. The thinking of centrifugal rhyme is not 
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something imposed onto language, but rather works with what is already there—this too 
poses a challenge to the additive conception of rhyme that seems to be at work in the 
discussion of Herbert. Referring to the etymology of symbol, a throwing together, 
Gibbons draws attention to one of the ways in which language can remember—and 
poetry can remind us—of things that have previously been forgotten. ‘The idea—which 
our language itself remembers, even if we do not—of a word that throws meaning or 
image does not seem out of place here.’ (p. 79) That is to say, what language remembers 
even if we have forgotten it is pertinent as much to the theorizing of poetry as to the 
thinking that takes place within poems themselves. This is the implication of the claim 
that language does not simply think, but, more specifically, thinks about itself, in a 
manner that is sufficiently difficult that it is described in the terms of a dense and 
complex simile: 
 
Let’s say that metaphor vivifies visible things as they are, and that ‘meta’ (the 
car seeing its own way in the dark) ‘thinks’ about something that is real, 
somewhere, somehow, but can only be ‘seen’ if illuminated in and by the 
imagination. 
And let’s say that language thinks about itself in this way and makes its own 
discoveries, by means of sound. (p. 76) 
 
The complexity of this multi-part and multi-layered simile (in which the multiple 
sets of scare quotes serve as a further reminder that the verbs in particular—everyday, 
familiar verbs—are being used in senses that are not only unfamiliar but also not 
interchangeable with or explicable by means of a more technical term) is such that 
rather than serving to explain, it itself invites and requires further elucidation. The 
thinking of language through sound is presented as comparable with the illumination of 
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something that was always present but not previously visible—only with the further 
complication that language, in directing its sonorous ‘illumination’ toward itself, is both 
knower and known. 
Gibbons’s intellectual framework of working against the grain is developed not 
only in response to his work’s engagement with the influence exerted, in different ways, 
by Davie and Cixous, but also in sensitive dialogue with the poems and techniques he 
considers such that they never appear as mere examples for the theory, which in turn is 
doubly responsive and responsible to the poems under discussion. Firstly, the theory is 
there to illuminate and to begin to formulate an account of the complex ways in which 
these poems think. And secondly it not only respects, with attentiveness, the 
particularity of each individual poem and even line, but also depends on it, for it 
develops its own thinking in a similar way, by illuminating or otherwise bringing to 
presence the previously hidden ways of thinking. This relationship of the theoretical 
paradigm to the poetry shows, contra Perloff’s claim, that it is not merely the case that 
that an engagement with theory need not take place at the expense of attending to the 
most specifically poetic details of poems, but can enable reflection on this engagement 
that both begins to set out its wider implications and pushes it deeper, enabling the 
engagement itself to become more sophisticated and more compelling. 
This notion of working against the grain, in its broadest sense of exploring the 
potential resources presented by what on first encounter seem to be detours, 
interruptions, hindrances and resistances, is, in a very different way, pertinent to the 
concerns of Rebecca Sanchez’s Deafening Modernism: Embodied Language and Visual 
Poetics in American Literature. Sanchez shares with Gibbons a deep concern with the 
palpable, material world and with the configuration of literature’s relationship to it, 
particularly through the individual encounter, which she conceptualizes through the 
optic of embodiment. Her approach to the encounter with the poem, however, differs 
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from that of Gibbons (and by no means from that of Gibbons alone) in that this 
embodiment is not configured in relation to the giving voice to a poem in sonorous 
language, but rather to the performance of poetry in American Sign Language, 
developing a model of what she terms ‘embodied impersonality—a self-shattering that 
nevertheless refuses the disavowal of the embodied subject’ (p. 31)—out of her 
engagement with the work of the ASL poets Peter Cook, Kenny Lerner and Debbie 
Rennie. 
Sanchez traces the lineage of her concern with embodiment back to Whitman, for 
whom ‘the idea of language in bodies was a way to ground language in the personal 
rather than the abstract’ (p. 26). And she argues that ASL has a particularly close 
relationship to this specificity, because ‘both spoken and written language can be 
separated from the body, whereas there can be no disembodiment of ASL’ (p. 25). She 
identifies a shift in this disembodiment in the early twentieth century with the 
development and increasingly widespread use of the typewriter, with the result that 
externalizable language in the form of writing no longer bore the trace of the individual 
human hand, and with the development of recording technologies which enable voices 
to be heard far away from their speakers. ‘It is out of this historical moment, which also 
saw the rise of first audio and then visual recording technology that allowed the 
separation of humans from their voices and images, that we get formalism, an approach 
to reading texts that detaches them from the external world.’ (p. 25) 
Her study is concerned with the relationship of ASL both to changing policies and 
debates as to its acceptability and appropriateness, debates which she sites in the wider 
context of the decrease in tolerance for linguistic diversity in the United States in the 
latter half of the nineteenth century, and to the poetic, literary and cultural traditions and 
legacies of modernism. Indeed, she explicitly relates the innovations of modernism to 
the changing political, technological, social and industrial context: 
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Modernist experimentations with the interaction of words and bodies on the 
printed page were also distinguished from earlier efforts by the concurrent rise in 
discourses surrounding bodily measurement, classification, and normatization. 
This merging of normative attitudes, as well as the development of the term 
‘norm’ itself, led to new crackdowns on individuals who either could not or would 
not conform. (p. 26) 
 
Sanchez links this to processes of linguistic exclusion, arguing that ‘[a]s with 
fears over linguistic diversity, this deviance was perceived as not only undesirable but 
threatening to what was popularly described as a brave new world in which science 
could improve humanity’ (p. 26). She relates the process whereby norms are developed 
and established to the more familiar accounts (such as Michael North’s The Dialect of 
Modernism) of the ways in which several modernist writers referenced and incorporated 
‘precisely the kind of language movements that standard English tried to repress’, and 
in doing so ‘called attention to the bodies that employed such language, bodies most 
likely to face discrimination in the push toward standardization’ (p. 27). She observes 
how the way in which they did so was not to ‘insert it into existing forms of literature as 
a kind of inclusive practice but rather to employ it as a means to shatter form itself, to 
produce new hybrid forms’ (p. 27)—among them her principal concerns of embodied 
and visual language. In response, she seeks to ‘tease out how and why the 
marginalization of Deaf culture and bodies, as well as of Deaf studies as a field, has 
occurred parallel to (but too frequently not in conversation with) the ongoing 
fascination with issues of embodied and visual language within modernist studies’ (p. 
34)—and to begin to rectify this situation. 
The potential resources offered by this approach are developed most persuasively 
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in her account of Peter Cook’s ASL poem ‘Poetry’, which ‘begins with Cook repeatedly 
and rhythmically signing the word POETRY (or, more precisely, ASL POETRY which is 
distinct from the musically focused sign for nonmanual verse)’, a concept on which the 
poem—and its performing author—carry out layers of reflection: 
 
The sign ASL POETRY is etymologically linked to the signs for ‘expression’ and 
‘inspire’ and moves outward from the chest—an offering up of the body, poetry as 
the expression of the self. The poem goes on to interrogate this link between the 
embodied production of the words and their semantic meaning through language 
play designed to highlight the way in which the words (like the sign ASL POETRY) 
emerge from and encircle Cook’s body.  
(p. 46) 
 
This bodily emergence of the words also emphasizes the links and relationships 
between them, as for example in her discussion of how in a section in which ‘the 
poem’s narrator paints a picture, the signs for both the canvas and the brush emerging 
organically from the repeated sign POETRY’ (p. 46). At this point, in an account that 
chimes with Dobbins’s account of language’s interaction with itself within written 
poetry, ‘the narrator—Cook—becomes both painter and painting’ (p. 46), a duality that 
results from the particular relationship of body to language in ASL. ‘Role shifting, a key 
feature of ASL grammar, enables him both to spread the paint on the canvas and then to 
embody the image created by that spread paint, to become the work of art within the 
work of art.’ (p. 46) 
As in Dobbins’s conception of poetic thinking, Sanchez’s account of the 
procedures of Cook’s poem and their implications is one in which he is using resources 
that are already present within language: so when she argues that ‘ASL literature 
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fundamentally problematizes the separation between authorial body and text’ (p. 48), it 
is able to do so in part as a result of the way in which this relationship between the 
narrating body and the words it narrates is configured within ASL—and in particular, 
the fact that ‘one cannot point to “Poetry” as an aesthetic object distinct from Cook’s 
body’ (p. 48). Using the resources that this configuration provides, Sanchez shows how 
Cook’s poem ‘offers an alternative variety of impersonality, one based on a literal 
interpenetration of authorial and textual bodies’ (p. 48). She offers a persuasive and 
challenging account of how the implications of this blurring of the conceptual 
separation between authorial body and text not only provide a corrective to the 
marginalization of Deaf culture and bodies, but also an enriched resource with which to 
work on poetry and poetics more broadly, as they not only, in her words, ‘usefully 
illuminate the engagement with these issues within written modernist texts’ (p. 48), but 
also, by calling into question some of the assumptions into which the concentration on 
verbal and written poetry makes it easy to fall, both present a challenge and—working 
against the grain—in doing so help us open up new ways of encountering, reflecting on 
and theorizing the thinking of poetic technique. 
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